The Allied Advance, April – July 1945
Following the Allied victories at Meiktila and Mandalay, the British 14th Army sped south towards the Burmese capital of Rangoon (now Yangon). Japanese forces in Burma were exhausted but were still able to mount a defence around Pyawbwe. However, the Allied force sent against them was too great to stop and the town was captured on 10 April.
With this obstacle overcome, Allied planners were ready to commence Operation Dracula, the joint amphibious and airborne assault on Rangoon. Spearheading this operation would be Gurkha paratroopers of the Indian Parachute Regiment.
On 1 May, 700 Gurkha paratroopers dropped around Elephant Point, a concentration of Japanese artillery guarding the Rangoon River. The Japanese stubbornly defended the Point, and the Gurkhas had to use flamethrowers to dislodge them.
With the Japanese artillery neutralised, the way was cleared for the Royal Navy to begin landing troops, and by 2 May Rangoon was under Allied control.
Airborne troops dropping around Rangoon, 1 May 1945.
Gurkha paratroopers parading through Rangoon, May 1945.
In June, the onset of the monsoon caused the Allied advance to slow. This gave the Japanese an opportunity to retreat and reorganise in the Pegu Yomas, with approximately 20,000 men of the 28th Army concentrated there by the end of June.
With Rangoon captured, Allied planners withdrew elements of the 14th Army to prepare for the liberation of Malaya, and on 28 May the 12th Army was formed to help mop up Japanese resistance in Burma.
The Japanese Situation
By summer 1945, what was left of Japan’s Burma Area Army was spread out across east and west Burma. The main concentrations were in the Pegu Yomas, Shan Hills, and east of the Sittang River, near the Burma-Thailand border. Whilst appearing like a large force on paper, its formations were severely reduced. For example, the 33rd Army’s fighting strength was down to just three battalions and one company of artillery.
In the Pegu Yomas, prospects for the Japanese 28th Army were grim. Even putting aside their perilous strategic situation, life for Japanese soldiers in the Yomas was miserable. Inadequately provisioned, the men were restricted to a ration of 250 grammes of food a day, forcing them to complement their diet with bamboo and local wildlife, such as lizards and snakes.
Knowing that the 28th Army could only remain in the Yomas for so long before the supply situation became critical, the breakout attempt was planned for late-July. Lacking boats, the Japanese made use of the abundant bamboo to make rafts.
To protect the breakout, General Kimura, commander of the Burma Area Army, directed the 33rd Army to harass Allied supply lines in a bid to divert as many men as possible from the Sittang. Meanwhile, Japanese officers in the Yomas meticulously plotted the best routes toward the river.
But even with the best planning, crossing the Sittang would still require the 28th Army to trek through miles of thick jungle, break through British lines, navigate through flooded paddies and cross a swollen river on crude rafts, all whilst being continuously subjected to massed artillery and airpower. But faced with the ‘dishonourable’ alternative of surrender, the men steeled themselves for their difficult journey.
Slim’s Trap
Unbeknownst to the Japanese, the Allies knew exactly what they were about to attempt. On 4 July, a patrol of the 1st Battalion, 7th Gurkha Rifles, led by Jemadar Gaubir Rai, captured detailed maps and operation orders for the breakout. Armed with this vital piece of intelligence, Slim and his staff were able to quickly reinforce the parts of the line that the Japanese were planning to attack.
John Masters, Chief of Staff for the 19th Indian Division, spent much of July driving up and down the line, ‘making dispositions as though for a rabbit shoot’. In his book The Road Past Mandalay, Masters described what awaited the Japanese:
‘Machine-guns covered each path out of the Yomas and each track out of the flooded fields. Infantry and barbed wire protected the machine-guns, all dug in on the only ground above water level. Behind, field guns stood ready to rain high explosive shells on every approach. Behind the guns, more infantry waited. We had removed all boats from the Sittang, and no one but the strongest swimmer could cross its hurrying yellow flood.’
Firmly entrenched along the Sittang, the 12th Army waited for the Japanese to make their move.
The Breakout Begins
On 3 July the Japanese 33rd Army, on the east side of the Sittang, began its diversion. Moving across the river, it attacked the 7th Indian Division near Waw. Despite its depleted state the 33rd Army managed to occupy several villages, surrounding the 4th Battalion, 8th Gurkha Rifles at Nyaungkashe.
For several days the battalion endured ferocious shellfire and determined attacks. Its position indefensible, 4/8GR was finally ordered to withdraw on the night of 6/7 July. Unwilling to leave anything behind for the Japanese, the Gurkhas waded armpit deep through the flooded paddies, carrying the wounded and almost all of their equipment, right down to their sewing machine.
Despite some local success, the Japanese attack failed in its primary goal of diverting the British, and the 7th Division held firm along the southern Sittang. Faced with flooded terrain and a well-equipped enemy, the 33rd Army’s attacked stalled out, and it withdrew on 7 July. It would pose no further threat.
With the failure of the diversion and the capture of their battle plans, any chance of a successful Japanese breakout was lost. Regardless, from 14 July the Japanese started in earnest toward the Sittang River, marching straight into the teeth of the 12th Army.
The Military Medal of Lance-Havildar Mohansing Rana, awarded for his gallantry at the Battle of Nyaungkashe in July 1945.
The Battle of the Sittang Bend
The breakout, known to history as the Battle of the Sittang Bend, was a bitter tragedy for the Japanese. Over the course of several weeks, the 12th Army engaged in the piecemeal destruction of the Japanese through bombardments, ambushes and small unit actions.
For 12th Army soldiers dug-in along the Sittang, the Japanese made easy targets. Floating down the river on rafts and logs, the Japanese were subjected to accurate rifle and machine-gun fire. The 17th Indian Division’s war history gives a detached report of operations in late-July 1945. In 4-days of operations, the division reported that it killed 836 Japanese soldiers, with the 3rd Battalion, 8th Gurkha Rifles accounting for 35 of them. For some in the 17th Division, the destruction of the Japanese was considered pay-back for its defeat at the Sittang Bridge in 1942.
John Masters gave a more expressive description of the Sittang Bend operations:
‘They came on, and out of the sheltering Yomas. The machine-guns got them, the Brens and rifles got them, the tanks got them, the guns got them. They drowned by hundreds in the Sittang, and their corpses floated in the fields and among the reeds’.
A Bren-gunner of the 8th Gurkha Rifles returning from a skirmish with the Japanese at the Sittang Bend, 1945
Although some Japanese soldiers made it across the river and eluded British forces, many of them would later be ambushed by Burmese militia groups before they reached Thailand.
As the Japanese 28th Army disintegrated, the condition and health of the men declined, with the soldiers starting to suffer from severe malnutrition and disease. On a patrol in the Pegu Yomas, John Cross, a young Second-Lieutenant in the 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles, came across a track strewn with sick and wounded Japanese soldiers.
Whilst using his phrase book to question a Japanese soldier about the strength of his force, the soldier subtly reached for his pistol. Fortunately, one of the Gurkhas noticed this and prevented Cross from being shot.
Because of the bitterness of the fighting in Burma, many British and Indian soldiers felt little sympathy for the Japanese. Despite the destruction being wrought upon them, Second-Lieutenant Patrick Davis of 4/8GR could not bring himself to feel pity, and later wrote, ‘One almost felt sorrow, but not quite’.
By early-August the Japanese breakout finally began to ebb. In the Sittang Bend operations, British forces had lost 96 killed and 322 wounded. The reports on Japanese casualties vary, but might have been as high as 13,000 killed, wounded and missing. Whilst the Burma Campaign would officially continue until the end of hostilities, this staggering defeat brought it to an effective conclusion.
For the first time, British forces in Burma began collecting large numbers of prisoners. For many veteran 12th Army soldiers, accustomed to the Japanese fighting to the death, collecting prisoners was an almost novel experience.
But as thousands of Japanese soldiers began to give themselves up, it gradually became apparent to Allied soldiers in Burma that Japan’s surrender was imminent.
Next month, Path to Victory will conclude with the turbulent days leading up to the surrender of Japan, and the perspective of Gurkha soldiers on the end of the Second World War.
