A nine‑man patrol was despatched from Sibu with a view to establishing the nature of the incursion and verify the reports received from local villagers. By now what had initially been expected to be a small group of Indonesian irregulars had grown into a group of some fifty or sixty, and Tac HQ decided that the nine‑man patrol should be increased in strength.
As it happened, there was a detachment of SAS in the area on training exercises, as well as three Border Scouts and two policemen, who, together with the Kapit District Officer, increased the available strength to twenty‑one.
On receiving further confirmation of the potential size of Indonesian party, Tac HQ decided further to increase the strength of the patrol by deploying a further fifteen men from C Company, by helicopter to the Blayong area, under the command of the Company Commander, Lt Hugh Wallace, with orders to establish a position across the tracks leading to the village of Rumah Blayong (being the most likely route for the enemy to take).
Moving forward from Blayong the now 36‑strong patrol split into two, one under Lt Wallace moving upstream along the rivers Bangkit and Ayat, in anticipation that this would be a probable route to be taken by the Indonesians, and the other led by Lt (QGO) Matbarsing Gurung proceeding on foot through the jungle.
At around midday on 16th August the river party spotted men in the river about 100 yards ahead, which they identified as being some of the Indonesian raiders. Surprise was lost when one of a passing group of Ibans fired a random shotgun shot, causing the Indonesians to scatter into the river banks and cover.
Leaving a bren gun and gunner in place to keep the enemy’s heads down, Lt Wallace took the remaining riflemen to explore a possible flanking position. Contact with the enemy was maintained until last light, with strong enemy fire continuing through until midnight.
At first light the next day, the bren gun party, together with several of the Gurkhas who had become detached from Lt Wallace’s group, withdrew back to Rumah Blayong from where Tac HQ were able to be briefed by radio.
On returning to the contact area, Lt Wallace’s body was found – he had been seriously wounded in the previous day’s action, and been secreted by his orderly who he dispatched to obtain help. Despite being well hidden he had been found by the enemy at some time during the night and was killed in an ensuing gunfight.
Reinforcements were deployed to the area of the contact in pursuit of the enemy, but, recognising that the strength of the enemy had been such, and that the resources of C Company were so stretched, Bde HQ decided, much to the disappointment of Tac HQ thereby denied the chance to avenge the death of Lt Wallace, to withdraw 2/6GR from the Third Division to concentrate on the Brunei/Sabah and Fifth Division Sarawak area.
1/2 GR took over responsibility for 3rd Division Sarawak and completed the repulsion of the Indonesian incursion. 2/6GR received the following message from GOC 17 Div, General Walter Walker:
“…… skilful reading of information, rapid and decisive deployment and tenacity led to the virtual elimination of two dangerous gangs at the sad cost of a promising young officer.”
Enemy losses were estimated at 13 to 15 casualties.
Meanwhile 1/6GR had been in UK since April 1962, and it was not until January 1964 that they returned to the Far East. After a couple of weeks’ acclimatisation in transit in Singapore, the Battalion was initially deployed in the western part of the 3rd Division of Sarawak, which had become “quiet”.
The CO eventually succeeded, in March, in getting higher authority to agree to the battalion’s redeployment to 1st Division Sarawak, where the situation was more “lively”.
It was also at about this time that new tactics were introduced towards deterring Indonesian cross‑border incursions; the policy, which remained secret for some time, was to take defence of the border aggressively, catching the enemy on his own territory. These cross‑border operations were known as “CLARET Operations”.
For the remainder of the conflict, both 1/6 GR and 2/6 GR were actively involved in these Operations, but rather than describe all those Operations in which 6GR were involved, all of which are covered in depth in the Regimental History, one period in 1/6 GR’s second tour in Borneo, which started in January 1965, illustrates the nature of these Operations.
In late April 1965 B Company 1/6 GR was ordered to undertake a CLARET Operation in the Tebedu area, on a river some 2000 yards over the Indonesian side of the border. The approach to the planned site for an ambush took three days over difficult, mountainous terrain and through secondary jungle – a route chosen in order to achieve surprise.
The ambush was laid shortly after dawn on the fifth day of the operation. Around five hours later at the right of the ambush a bren group spotted enemy approaching down the track; waiting until the enemy approached to within 15 yards of his position the gunner fired and killed the leading four enemy. The remaining enemy threw themselves into cover on either side of the track and a fifth enemy was killed by the bren group commander.
A further enemy party opened heavy fire, somewhat inaccurately, on the ambush position from further down river and B Company Commander, Capt. Gordon Herring, decided to withdraw under cover of defensive artillery fire, the heaviness of which caused the enemy to withdraw.
The Company successfully withdrew across the border back into Sarawak, having successfully killed five enemy and caused an unknown number of wounded at no cost to themselves.
The operation well illustrated the inherent tracking skills of the Gurkhas, their jungle craft operating in dense jungle, but, above all, the discipline and self‑control required when deciding to spring an ambush, and displayed so effectively by the bren gunner on this occasion.
A second, similar action followed involving Maj Colin Scott’s A Company, which resulted in further enemy casualties, both as a result of a successfully laid ambush and heavy defensive artillery fire which repelled the attempted enemy counter‑attack.
The Confrontation campaign ended on 11th August 1966. Units of the Brigade of Gurkhas had borne the brunt of the campaign and 6 GR had played a considerable part in it.
1/6 GR had returned to Hong Kong in June that year; 2/6 GR, having spent the entire campaign based in Seria and operating from there, left for Kluang in Malaysia at the end of the year.
